The present paper develops a product cycle model of North South trade and integrates Romer (1990) model and Helpman (1993) 
Introduction
Technological progress is one of the key components of economic growth and intellectual property rights play an important role in determining technological progress. The agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property issues (TRIPS) have been put on agenda of Uruguay round of trade negotiations under the GATT 1994. This agreement requires that both the developed and developing countries should mutually agree to strengthen their IPRs.
The effect of IPR on growth rate has been subject of debate for long time. There is a substantial theoretical and empirical literature on international trade dealing with the issue of effect of IPR on technological progress and growth 1 . Helpman (1993) shows that in the long run, rate of growth of technology (rate of innovation) is decreased in response to tighter IPR. Mondal and Gupta (2008a) show that even in the presence of unemployment and efficiency wage hypothesis Helpman (1993) result holds. According to Lai (1998) Helpman (1993) result holds if imitation is the channel of production transfer and opposite happens if multinationalization is the channel of production transfer. Akiyama and Furukawa (2009) show that there is an inverted U shaped relationship between IPR and rate of innovation incorporating the concept of appropriability of innovation. When technologies are masked strenghthening IPR encourages innovation and when technologies are not masked opposite happens. Mondal and Gupta (2008b) show that strengthening IPR may have a positive effect on rate of innovation in the presence of international labour mobility in Helpman (1993) model. This paper integrates Romer (1990) model and Helpman (1993) Ventura (1997) this paper assumes that final goods are not traded while capital-intensive intermediate goods are traded. The effect of intellectual property rights on economic growth is studied. We show that there may exist a unique steady state balanced growth equilibrium or there may exist multiple steady state equilibria and tighter intellectual property rights lead to both higher and lower steady state balanced growth rate depending on the human capital endowment. This contradicts the result obtained by Helpman (1993) .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model, Section 3 presents the description of basic model, Section 4 contains the analysis of the the steady state balanced growth equilibrium, Section 5 presents numerical results. This section gives examples of steady state balanced growth equilibrium and also studies the effect of change in IPR on growth rate numerically and concluding remarks are made in Section 6. The specification of production technology of final goods sector and intermediate goods sector are same as Romer (1990) . The production function of jth country is given by 
The model
The production technology of R & D sector of North and South are same as Helpman (1993 
Let the fraction of goods that have not yet been imitated be ξ = An A . Total human capital stock of south is employed in final goods production sector. So total human capital stock of south is given by,
Total human capital stock of North is allocated between final goods production sector and R & D sector. Hence the total human capital stock of North is given byH
Individuals of North and South derive utility from consumption of final goods. The utility function of the representative individual is given by
where C j is the consumption of final goods in jth country. The dynamic budget constraint of South is given bẏ
The dynamic budget constraint of North is given bẏ
where r j is the price per unit of capital in jth country, w j is the wage given to the skilled labour of jth country and P j is the price of the final good produced in jth country.
Note that a part of r s K s and r n K n capture export income of South and North respectively and import expenditure of South and North are implicit in P s C s and P n C n respectively. We assume that trade is always balanced. Trade Balance Equation implies that the value of import of each country is equal to the value of export of each country and is given by
denotes the price charged by ith firm of j country from jth country. 
Discussions of the model
and w j is given by 
with respect to x n n (i) and x n s (i). In equilibrium, the outputs sold to North and South by the ith intermediate good firm of North are given by
∀i and all Northern intermediate good firms will charge same price from South and North and that price is
Hence monopoly profit of any intermediate good Northern firm is given by αp n x n .
Intermediate goods sector of South
Intermediate good firms of South are perfectly competitive. In equilibrium they must earn equal marginal revenue from North and South and in the longrun profit of each firm must be zero. Faced with the given values of H Y j and r s ; a Southern intermediate good firm will choose a level of output x s for which marginal revenue earned from both countries are same and profit is zero. The profit function of ith Southern intermediate good industry is given by 
and 
Equilibrium wage determination
Profit of research firm in North is given by
Since R& D sector in North are competitive, wage of skilled labour employed in R &D firm of North is obtained by maximizing π n r with respect to H A n and that is given by w
Now no arbitrage condition implies
Using equations (9), (10), (11), (12), (17) and (18) we have
Since each intermediate good industry of South sells exactly the same quantity of output to North (x s n is same for all i) and each Northern firm sells exactly same quantity of output to its own country (x n n is same for all i), the total output of final goods sector in North is given by
Wage given to skilled labours employed in final goods production sector of North is given by
No arbitrage condition of skilled labour market implies that w n A = w n Y . Using equations (11), (15), (19) and (20) implies human capital employed in final goods sector in North is obtained and that is given by
Note that if ξ, r s , r n are constant H Y n is also constant. Human capital employed in R & D sector of North is given by
Since each intermediate good industry of South sells exactly the same quantity of output to South (x s s is same for all i) and each Northern firm sells exactly same quantity of output to South (x n s is same for all i), the total output of final goods sector is given by
In South H Y s is fixed atH Y s . The wage of the skilled labours employed in final goods production sector of South is given by
Using equations (10), (11), (14), (15), (23), (20) we have 
Optimisation problem of Household
The optimisation problem of Northern Household is to maximize
subject to the dynamic budget constraint of North given by equation (7).C n is the control variable and K n is the state variable. Northern household will consider E n to be exogenously given. The rate of growth of consumption is given byĊ
Similarly the optimisation problem of Southern Household is to maximize
subject to the dynamic budget constraint of North given by equation (6).C s is the control variable and K s is the state variable. Southern household will consider E s to be exogenously given. The rate of growth of consumption is given byĊ
Balanced Growth Equilibrium
A balanced growth equilibrium is defined as an equilibrium where Y s , Y n , K s , K n , A s , A n , A grow at constant exponential rate and ξ, r n , r s are constant. Let the constant growth rate of A be g. From equation (4), A grows at a constant rate implies H A n is constant which again implies H Y n is constant. H Y n is not constant unless ξ is constant. The growth rate of ξ is given byξ ξ = g ξ − m − g. In balanced growth equilibrium the value of ξ is given by
The constant value of ξ imples A, A s , A n grow at same constant rate g. Now, using equations (2), (3), (10), (11), (14) and (15) we have
Since r s , r n , H are also constants. It implies K s , K n , A s , A n grow at same constant rate g. As the trade is balanced using equations (15 ), (16), (12), (10) and (8) we have
From the above equation (27), the ratio of final good in both countries is obtained.
In South
Ys A is given by
In North
Yn A is given by
Note that if ξ, r s , r n are constant So from equations (24) and (25) we have
Hence in steady state equilibrium r n = r s = r(let 
> r).
Using equations (4), (21)and (22) we have
Hence we have
Equation (30) represents the demand side growth rate and equation (31) represents supply side growth rate. In equilibrium g d = g s . Combining equations (26), (30) and (31) we have
Hence we get
where
Clearly a is always positive. Regarding sign of b, c and d following four cases may emerge. (1−α) (1−α)
is positive. In this case, there exist two positive and one negative steady state solutions of balanced growth rate.
Case (vi) When i) When α = 0.5, σ = 0.5, m = 0.5, δ = 1,H n = 6,H s = 2, ρ = 0.05 yields growth rate 2.593 and other two growth rates are complex conjugates; ii)When α = 0.5, σ = 0.01, m = 0.5, δ = 0.5,H n = 3,H s = 2.5, ρ = 0.05 yields growth rate 0.557 and other two growth rates are complex conjugates;
iii)When α = 0.5, σ = 0.5, m = 0.1, δ = 1,H n = 6,H s = 2, ρ = 0.05 yields two positive growth rates 0.0528, 2.84051 and one negative growth rate.
iv)When α = 0.5, σ = 0.1, m = 0.4, δ = 0.5,H n = 3,H s = 2.9, ρ = 0.03 yields growth rate 0.2 and other two growth rates are complex conjugates; v) When α = 0.5, σ = 0.1, m = 0.1, δ = 0.5,H n = 10,H s = 7, ρ = 0.03 yields two positive growth rates 0.138865, 3.821396 and one negative growth rate.
vi) For every possible numerical specifications we found that
That contradicts our definition of North and South i.e. positive b and positive d can not occur simultaneously. Hence we could not find any example of non-existence of growth rates.
Proposition 1 There exists atleast one positive balanced growth rate. Under case (i) and case (ii), unique growth rate exists, otherwise multiple steady state growth equilibria may exist.
Effect of change in IPR on growth rate
In this section, we study the effect of on growth rate numerically. Following Helpman (1993) we capture the change in IPR by change in m. Strengthening IPR implies lowering the value of m. We investigate the effect of change in m on growth rate. We found that [A separate file named 'Figures' is attached with this file.] in case 2 and case 4 where there exists unique growth rate, there exists positive relationship between m and g. In case 1, with increase in m initially growth rate reduces a bit but afterwards it shows steady increase. In case 3 and case 5, we got two positive balanced growth rates. In both the cases higher of the growth rates declines with response to increase in m. In case 3, lower of the growth rates shows inverted U shaped relationship in reponse to increase in m and in case 5, that shows steady increase in response to increase in m.
In Grossman, Helpman (1991) and Helpman (1993) In our model, we have positive relationship between g and m in case 2 and case 4 whenH n andH s are neither too high nor too low and are quite close. This result is close to the finding of Falvey, Foster and Greenaway (2004) who found that IPR protection and growth are negatively related for middle income countries. Note that in case 1 and case 3, except m all other parameters are same. If we keep on increasing m initially we get case 3 and then case 1. If we combine Figure 1 and Figure 4 , we will get a U shaped curve. So for parameter specification of case 1 and case 3, lower of the growth rates shows inverted U shaped relationship with increase in m while higher of the growth rates shows U shaped relationship with increase in m.
In Helpman (1993) model, increase in technology transfer (imitation) raises cost of capital because an increase in the rate of imitation raises the risk of market displacement for the typical Northern firm. Hence innovation is discouraged. On the other hand, as technology transfer rises, smaller is the steady state share of products manufactured in North, less labour is employed in R & D, more labour is employed in manufacturing and so sales of each Northern firm for a given total number of products is higher. Hence profit rate per brand increases and innovation is encouraged. So, we get negative relationship between imitation and innovation through first channel and positive relationship between imitation and innovation through second channel. In Helpman (1993) model, the second effect outweighs the first effect. But in our model, as the intermediate goods are traded, when imitation is increased though the steady state share of products manufactured in North decreases, sales per brand may not be higher. This is because intermediate good firm does not require labour employment. It only requires physical capital as input. Moreover, Northern final good firm also uses intermediate goods produced in South. Hence in our model, even through second channel, innovation may be discouraged. Similarly when IPR is strenghthened, imitation is decreased, more intermediate goods are produced in North, Northern firm faces lower risk of being imitated, moreover there is a possibility of export income earned by intermediate good firms of North. So innovation may be encouraged. This explains negative relationship between imitation and innovation. For developed countries this export income is higher but for low and middle income countries the possibility of export income is not very high and we get positive relationship between imitation and innovation.
Proposition 2 Stronger IPR may result into either higher or lower balanced global growth rate.
Rivera Batiz and Romer (1991) show that when two countries are innovator growth rate increases if there is free flow of information between two countries. In that model strengthening IPR would result into decrease in growth rate. But in this model as IPR is strengthened in case 3, Figure 4 and case 5, Figure  7 Northern R & D firm faces less threat of their ideas being transferred to South. So they are more encouraged to produce more ideas. This induces the growth rate to be higher as a result of stronger IPR. However, note that strengthening of IPR will negatively affect the trade balance of South.
Using data set of 47 developed and developing countries from 1970 to 1990, Schneider(2005) suggests that IPRs have a stronger impact on domestic innovation for developed countries and might even negatively impact innovation in developing countries. While analysing panel data of 80 countries Falvey, Foster and Greenaway (2004) find that IPR protection is positively and significantly related to growth for low and high income countries but not for middle income countries. This paper suggests that one possible reason of their finding may be low income countries are engaged in trade of capital intensive intermediate goods with high income countries. Gould and Gruben (1996) find that stronger IPR correspond to higher economic growth rates in a cross country sample. The results found in this theoretical paper tally with this empirical result.
Conclusion
We have constructed a North-South model of product development where we have assumed that North innovates the variety of intermediate good and South imitates it with a time lag. The intermediate good market in South is perfectly competitive while that of North is monopolistic. So South can sell it at a much cheaper price. Hence once South imitates a product, North no longer produces it. In this model, capital-intensive intermediate goods are traded but final goods are not traded. We find some interesting results. We show that there may exist a unique steady state balanced growth equilibrium or there may exist multiple steady state equilibria and tighter intellectual property rights lead to both higher and lower steady state balanced growth rate depending on the availability of human capital. Helpman (1993) finds this impact to be negative. No North South trade model based on product cycle theory has investigated the effect of IPR on growth considering trade in intermediate goods. This paper fills the gap.
Our results have very important policy implication. We observe that in case 3 and case 5 higher of the two growth rates show negative relationship with m i.e. as IPR is strengthened m falls and g rises. But this happens only if both the countries exhibit high steady state balanced growth rate. So for advanced nations stengthening IPR results into higher growth rate but for low and middle income countries strengthening IPR results into lower growth rates. This result tallies with the observation made by Schneider (2005) . So strengthening of IPR can be advocated in developing countries following the recommendations of TRIPS but at the same time it is important to raise human capital level of developing countries by improving its health and education sector so as to obtain positive balanced global rate of growth.
However, our analysis is subject to some limitations. We do not consider trade in final goods, the possibility of human capital accumulation, cost of imitation, innovation in South, multinationalisation of Northern firms, unemployment in labour market, international migration of physical capital and labour. We make only steady state analysis and do not analyze transitional dynamics of model. Hence in this extended model we do not derive any results regarding welfare effect of IPR on two countries. However, positive effect of rate of innovation should influence welfare of two countries positively.
